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A two-sided matching decision method for supply and demand of technological 
knowledge 
 
Abstract: 
Purpose – The purpose is to propose a novel prospect-based two-sided matching decision model 
for matching supply and demand of technological knowledge assisted by a broker. This model 
enables the analyst to account for the stakeholders’ psychological behaviours and their impact on 
the matching decision in an open innovation setting.  
Design/methodology/approach – The prospect theory and grey relational analysis are employed 
to develop the proposed two-sided matching decision framework.  
Findings – By properly calibrating model parameters, the case study demonstrates that the 
proposed approach can be applied to real-world technological knowledge trading in a market for 
technology (MFT) and yields matching results that are more consistent with the reality. 
Research limitation/implications – The proposed model does not differentiate the types of 
knowledge exchanged (established vs. novel, tacit vs. codified, general vs specialized) [Ardito et 
al. 2016, Nielsen and Nielsen 2009]. Moreover, the model focuses on incorporating psychological 
behaviour of the MFT participants and does not consider their other characteristics. 
Practical implications – The proposed model can be applied to achieve a better matching 
between technological knowledge suppliers and users in a broker-assisted MFT.  
Social implications – A better matching between technological knowledge suppliers and users can 
enhance the success of open innovation, thereby contributing to the betterment of the society.  
Originality/value – This paper furnishes a novel theoretical model for matching supply and 
demand in a broker-assisted MFT. Methodologically, the proposed model can effectively capture 
market participants’ psychological considerations.  
Keywords – Open innovation, Market for technology, Two-sided matching, Grey relational 
analysis, Prospect theory 
Paper type – Research paper 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In the current competitive environment, enterprises face increasing pressure to produce 
innovative products and respond to customer needs and market demand expeditiously [Ivascu, 
Cirjaliu, Draghici, 2016]. Nowadays, it becomes increasingly difficult for a firm to purely rely on 
in-house talents for product innovation. Instead, a more efficient and convenient way is to meet 
the challenge by open innovation, trading in or out technological knowledge in the market. It is 
observed that open innovation and effective and expeditious transfer of technological knowledge 
often result in significant economic benefit [Petruzzelli et al., 2015]. As such, more and more 
enterprises count on open innovation for enhancing profitability and securing competitive 
advantages [Chesbrough, 2003; Cheng & Huizingh, 2014].  
A common form of open innovation is to trade technological knowledge such as patents from 
markets for technology (MFTs) [Petruzzelli et al., 2015; Hansen et al., 1999]. In MFTs, 
universities and research institutes are key creators or suppliers of technological knowledge, and 
enterprises are potential users and adopters [Arora et al. 2014; Arora et al. 2001a, b; Arora and 
Gambardella 2010]. In this market, suppliers select appropriate users as per expected benefits as a 
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result of knowledge transfer, while users often acquire technological knowledge based on their 
specific needs [Gielen et al., 2003], prior ties with suppliers as well as technological knowledge 
characteristics [Petruzzelli, 2011; Capaldo et al., 2016]. Success of open innovation depends on 
how well enterprises collaborate with suppliers [Enkel et al. 2009; Ivascu, Cirjaliu, Draghici, 
2016]. To expedite knowledge transfer and promote open innovation, governments can create 
polices and regulations to reduce barriers between suppliers and users of technological knowledge 
[Maas et al., 2016; Dulipovici et al., 2016; Girard, 2015]. To implement these policies, public or 
private brokers are often formed to facilitate technological knowledge exchange between suppliers 
and users in the MFT [Hoppe and Ozdenoren, 2005]. By providing value-added service, brokers 
can also obtain some benefit. Given that finding appropriate suppliers and users in the MFT can be 
conveniently structured as a typical two-sided matching problem [Gale and Shapley, 1962; Roth, 
1985], this article proposes a novel decision model for matching supply and demand of 
technological knowledge in a broker-assisted MFT. 
 
2 Technological knowledge exchange under the open innovation paradigm 
 
Technological knowledge such as patents is often a crucial asset for a firm [Petruzzelli et al., 
2015; Hansen et al., 1999]. Rapid pace of technology advancement makes it difficult for any firm 
to achieve self-sufficiency in R&D, technological knowledge exchange has become a much more 
effective and efficient way for suppliers and users to collaborate in R&D and implement open 
innovation.  
In order to handle technological knowledge exchange problems, Arora et al. [2001a, b] 
proposed the concept of MFTs. Subsequently, more and more research has been carried out on this 
topic and some useful results have been obtained. For example, by surveying recent research on 
MFTs, Arora and Gambardella [2010] analyzed the supply and demand of technology, examined 
what factors affect MFT formation and growth, and explored the dynamic interactions between 
industry structure and MFTs [Arora et al. 2014]. In contrast to the traditional focus on either 
external technology acquisition or exploitation, Lichtenthaler and Ernst [2007] and Lichtenthaler 
[2008] took an integrative view to investigate a firm’s inward and outward technology transfers 
and treated them as the key dimensions of the firm’s strategic approaches to open innovation. 
Natalicchio et al. [2014] reviewed recent literature on markets for ideas (MFIs) arising from the 
open innovation paradigm and furnished an overview of MFIs from three aspects: ideas, 
knowledge owners, and knowledge seekers. Messeni Petruzzelli et al. [2015] investigated what 
affected biotechnological firms’ patent acquisition by examining four main characteristics of the 
patent.  
From a matching point of view, some scholars utilized game theory and decision models to 
deal with technological knowledge exchange. For instance, in the context of demand-driven 
production chains in the Dutch agricultural sector, Klerkx and Leeuwis [2008] discussed the 
contributions of innovation intermediaries to matching supply and demand of agricultural 
knowledge and challenges that they face in their functioning. Hoppe and Ozdenoren [2005] 
presented a game theoretic framework to analyze the function of a single intermediary and 
competing intermediaries in matching supply and demand of new inventions. Chen et al. [2010] 
put forward a two-stage decision analysis method for handling two-sided matching of 
technological knowledge supply and demand. While the aforesaid methods are important tools to 
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handle technological knowledge exchange under the open innovation paradigm, they ignored the 
impact of the stakeholders’ psychological behaviours on the matching of technological knowledge 
supply and demand. This omission often leads to matching results that are inconsistent with what 
happens in reality. This inconsistency is due to the fact that stakeholders (suppliers, users, and 
brokers) typically have bounded rationality and the success of a matching pair is often affected by 
perceptions and considerations that are psychological rather than economic in MFTs [Erel, 2004]. 
This article attempts to introduce a novel two-sided matching decision model for unbalanced 
numbers of suppliers and users assisted by a single intermediary or broker. The prospect theory 
proposed in [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992] is employed to 
characterize stakeholders’ psychological considerations and their impact on the matching decision. 
The grey relational analysis [Liu and Lin, 2011] is then applied to derive positive and negative 
correlation coefficients, thereby obtaining final prospect values for different stakeholders. 
Optimization models are subsequently constructed to find optimal matching of suppliers and users 
in terms of prospect values. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The basic model is presented for 
two-sided matching of technological knowledge supply and demand in Section 3. Section 4 
proposes a novel framework for two-sided matching of suppliers and users in a broker-assisted 
MFT by considering stakeholders’ psychological behaviours. A real-world open innovation case 
study is furnished in Section 5 to illustrate how the proposed method can be applied. The paper is 
concluded with some remarks in Section 6. 
 
3 A framework for two-sided matching of technological knowledge exchange 
 
In a MFT, three parties are often involved: suppliers, users, and an independent intermediary 
or broker. Suppliers of technological knowledge are usually universities or research institutions 
who own patents and other technological knowledge. Users stand for entrepreneurs, investors, or 
firms who are interested in commercializing technological knowledge for perceived benefits. An 
intermediary or broker is a service organization that assists in matching supply with demand of 
technological knowledge based on the information provided by the two parties and charges 
commissions for successful matching. In the matching process, suppliers and users first submit to 
the broker relevant information on their needs and requirements, the broker then conducts 
necessary decision analysis to choose potential matching pairs in the pools. The broker aims for 
best matching results by maximizing its own expected profit as well as meeting the needs and 
requirements of the suppliers and users to the greatest possible extent. In order to characterize 
their interactions, a two-sided matching method is proposed below.  
Assume that the supplier and user sets in the matching problem are denoted by
 1,..., ,...,i nS S S S= and  1,..., ,...,j mD D D D= , ( 1,2,..., )iS i n=  and ( 1,2,jD j =  ..., )m , 
respectively, stands for the 
thi  supplier and the 
thj  user of technological knowledge. Suppliers 
and users often assess their potential matching partners against multiple criteria. 
Assume that  1,...., ,...,k pA A A A=  is the suppliers’ criterion set to evaluate potential 
users. ijka ( 1,2,..., , 1, 2,..., , 1, 2,..., )i n j m k p= = =  denotes Si’s evaluation value for user Dj as 
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per criterion Ak and ( 1,2,..., ,kw k p= 0kw  ,
1
1)
p
k
k
w
=
=  represents the weight of criterion kA . 
Then iS ’s overall assessment value of jD  is obtained as 
1
p
ij ijk k
k
a a w
=
=           (1) 
Let  1,..., ,...,s qB B B B=  be the users’ criterion set to assess suppliers, ijsb (i = 1, 2, …, 
n; j = 1, 2, …, m, and s = 1, 2, …, q) be Dj’s evaluation value of supplier iS  with respect to the 
index sB , and 
1
( 1,2,..., , 0, 1)
q
s s s
s
s q  
=
=  =  be the weight of criterion sB . Then Dj’s 
overall evaluation value of iS  is derived as 
1
q
ij ijs s
s
b b 
=
=          (2) 
Brokers commonly exist in the knowledge service industry. A broker often has better access 
to the pools on both supply and demand sides and is thus able to achieve more efficient matching 
between technological knowledge suppliers and users. By providing this service, a broker 
typically collects a commission based on the realized satisfaction for the traders in a successful 
matching pair. For a single broker in our model, let ijr  stand for the broker’s commission for the 
matching pair iS  and jD .  
In the context of technological knowledge exchange, a particular patent can often be licensed 
to at most one user. In this case, a proper constraint should be imposed on the suppliers of 
technological knowledge. On the other hand, due to high cost of licensing and limited resources, a 
user typically has an upper limit on the number of technology transfers that it can accept. Based on 
these considerations, a generic framework can be set up below for matching supply and demand of 
technological knowledge. 
Definition 1 Assume that : S D →  is a matching rule. For iS S  , jD D  , if 
( )i jS D = , then   and ( , )i jS D  are, respectively, called two-sided matching and a 
matching pair of supply and demand of technological knowledge. 
( )i jS D =  represents two-sided matching of iS  and jD  under  . Presumably, this 
matching rule reflects the evaluation values of Si on Dj, Dj on Si, the commission of the broker as 
well as any practical constraints on the number of technology transfers that a user can accept and 
the number of users to which a supplier can sell its technological knowledge. If ( )i iS S =  and 
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( )j jD D = , no matching is achieved for iS  or jD  under  . It is apparent that if ( , )i jS D
is a matching pair under  , then ( , )j iD S  is also a matching pair under  . 
 
4 A two-sided matching decision model for technological knowledge exchange with 
psychological considerations 
 
The aforesaid generic framework takes stakeholders’ original evaluation values as basic 
decision input in identifying appropriate matching pairs. This treatment implicitly assumes that the 
decision-makers (DMs) are perfectly rational and the matching is conducted based on the best 
aggregate evaluation score. However, stakeholders often consider other factors such as prior ties 
and geographical distance [Petrizzelli, 2011]. In addition, stakeholders typically possess bounded 
rationality and their matching decision behaviour is often affected by psychological other than 
economic considerations. As such, when a matching decision is considered, raw evaluation values 
certainly matter, but psychological assessments of the differences between a stakeholder’s raw 
evaluation and expectation often play a critical role in the decision process. Depending on a DM’s 
risk attitude, decision results under psychological influence can be quite different from what are 
obtained from the expected utility theory under complete rationality.  
Kahneman and Tversky [1979] and Tversky and Kahneman [1992] conceived decision 
making as a two-stage process. The first stage establishes a reference point for evaluating potential 
decision outcomes. When a decision outcome is better than the reference point, it would be 
regarded as a “gain”; when a decision outcome is worse than the reference point, it would be 
referred to as a “loss”. After recoding the decision outcomes as gains or losses, prospects can be 
extracted by performing segregation, cancellation, and other operations. The second stage assesses 
the prospects based on a value function that measures changes in welfare relative to the reference 
point rather than the absolute magnitude of the final states [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992]. By employing the prospect theory to account for psychological 
influences and expected values (prospect values) of suppliers, users, and the broker on 
technological knowledge matching decision, this section proposes a novel framework for 
two-sided matching of suppliers and users in a broker-assisted MFT. This method starts with 
constructing prospect value matrices for the stakeholders. 
 
4.1 Construction of prospect value matrices 
 
Many statistical methods, such as regression analysis and principal-component analysis, are 
commonly used in analyzing system behaviour. These methods typically require a large amount of 
data following certain probability distributions. But in reality, many applications have limited 
historical data, making it difficult to apply these methods. For instance, in the two-sided matching 
decision considered here, due to the unique feature of technology innovation, it is often the case 
that limited data are available for the stakeholders to make the final choice. To properly handle 
this type of small sample data problems, the grey relational analysis can be a handy tool as it is 
applicable to cases of various sample sizes and different distributions. The fundamental idea of 
grey relational analysis is that the closeness of a relationship is judged by the similarity level of 
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the geometric patterns of sequence curves. The more similar the curves, the higher the degree of 
incidence between sequences, and vice versa [Liu and Lin, 2011]. Given that suppliers, users, and 
the broker typically have limited historical data, the grey relational analysis is employed here to 
obtain their prospect values for making the matching decision. 
First, we consider the suppliers. 
4.1.1 The prospect value matrix for the suppliers 
 
After identifying positive and negative ideal users, we will employ the grey relational 
analysis to obtain suppliers’ positive and negative prospect values for users. 
Definition 2 Assume that
11 1 1
1
1
,...., ,...,
              
= ,...., ,...,
              
,...., ,...,
j m
i ij im
n nj nm
a a a
A a a a
a a a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
is the evaluation matrix of suppliers on 
users, if  
1( ) max( ) max( ,..., ,..., )j ij j ij nj
i
a a a a a+ = =     (3) 
1( ) min( ) min( ,..., ,..., )j ij j ij nj
i
a a a a a− = =     (4) 
Then ( )0 1 ,..., ,...,j mD a a a+ + + +=  and ( )0 1 ,..., ,...,j mD a a a− − − −=  are, respectively, called 
the positive and negative ideal users for the suppliers. Let ,ij ja a
+ +=  ij ja a
− −= , 
1,2,..., ; 1, 2,..., ,i n j m= = one has ( )ij n mD a
+ +

=  and ( )ij n mD a
− −

= . 
Let ij ij ijd a a
+ += − and ij ij ijd a a
− −= − , based on the grey relational analysis [Liu and Lin, 
2011], the positive and negative correlation coefficients 
ij
+  and 
ij
−  of supplier iS ’s 
evaluations from the positive and negative ideal users 0D
+
 and 0D
−
 are obtained as 
min min max max
max max
ij ij
i j i j
ij
ij ij
i j
d d
d d



+ +
+
+ +
+
=
+
     (5) 
min min max max
max max
ij ij
i j i j
ij
ij ij
i j
d d
d d



− −
−
− −
+
=
+
     (6) 
where   is a distinguishing coefficient and is usually set at 0.5 [Liu and Lin, 2011]. 
Based on the prospect theory [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979], when a DM faces definite 
losses, he/she tends to be risk-seeking. Conversely, if a DM faces sure gains, he/she tends to be 
risk-averse. In the matching decision process, for the suppliers of technological knowledge, if the 
positive ideal users 0D
+
 are taken as reference points, definite losses will encourage them to seek 
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risk; if the negative ideal users 0D
−
 are set as reference points, certain gains will induce them to 
avoid risk. This analysis indicates that the positive and negative correlation coefficients can be, 
respectively, taken as the basic input to determine Si’s negative and positive prospect values as 
shown below: 
( )
( )
ij ij
ij ij
v
v



 
+ −
− +
 =

= −
     (7) 
where   and   stand for the concave and convex degrees of the power function in gain and 
loss areas, respectively;   is a risk-averse parameter of the value function; If 1  , a DM tends 
to be more sensitive to losses, and the bigger the  , the higher the degree of loss aversion. 
Experimental data from different countries and regions indicate that, if 1  , 1  , DMs 
tend to be conservative, while if 1  , 1  , DMs are more aggressive. Therefore, when the 
prospect values are determined, the DMs’ risk profiles should be properly considered.   
The overall prospect value ijv  for iS  matching with jD  is thus obtained by taking into 
account both the positive and negative prospect values 
ijv
+
 and 
ijv
−
 as follows: 
ij ij ijv v v
+ −= +      (8) 
This results in the prospect value matrix 
ij n m
P v

 =   for the suppliers. 
4.1.2 The prospect value matrix for the users 
 
In a similar fashion, one can determine the prospect values of the users on the suppliers. 
Definition 3 Assume that 
11 1 1
1
1
,...., ,...,
              
= ,...., ,...,
              
,...., ,...,
i n
j ij nj
m im nm
b b b
B b b b
b b b
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 is the evaluation matrix of users on 
suppliers, if  
 
1( ) max( ) max( ,..., ,..., )i ij i ij im
j
b b b b b+ = =      (9) 
1( ) min( ) min( ,..., ,..., )i ij i ij im
j
b b b b b− = =      (10) 
Then ( )0 1 ,..., ,...,
T
i nS b b b
+ + + +=  and ( )0 1 ,..., ,...,
T
i nS b b b
− − − −=  are, respectively, called 
the positive and negative ideal suppliers for the users of technological knowledge. Let ,ij ib b
+ +=  
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ij ib b
− −= , 1,2,..., ; 1, 2,..., ,i n j m= = one has ( )ij n mS b
+ +

=  and ( )ij n mS b
− −

= . 
 
Similarly, let 
ij ij ijd b b
+ += −  and ij ij ijd b b
− −= − . By using the grey relational analysis 
method [Liu and Lin, 2011], the positive and negative correlation coefficients between jD ’s 
evaluations and 0S
+
 and 0S
−
 are determined as follows: 
min min max max
max max
ij ij
i j i j
ij
ij ij
i j
d d
d d



+ +
+
+ +
+
=
+
     (11) 
min min max max
max max
ij ij
i j i j
ij
ij ij
i j
d d
d d



− −
−
− −
+
=
+
     (12) 
where   is a distinguishing coefficient and is generally set at 0.5 [Liu and Lin, 2011]. 
Based on the prospect theory, jD ’s positive prospect value ijv
+
 and negative prospect value 
ijv
−
 are computed as 
( )
( )
ij ij
ij ij
v
v



 
+ −
− +
 =

= −
      (13)
 
Accordingly, the overall prospect value ijv  for user jD  is obtained as 
ij ij ijv v v
+ −= +           (14) 
which can be represented as a prospect value matrix 
ij m n
Q v

 =    for the users. 
 
4.1.3 The prospect value matrix for the broker 
 
In facilitating matching supply with demand of technological knowledge, as an independent 
economic agent, the broker typically has its own preferences on different matching pairs. As a 
profit-driven organization, after considering the prospect values of suppliers and users, it is 
understandable that the broker is more willing to promote a matching pair with a higher 
commission than the one with a lower commission.  
Definition 4 For a matching pair ( , )i jS D , let ijr  be the broker’s commission for the 
matching pair and 
0f  be the broker’s common expected profit for any matching pair, then 
 
0
max
ij
ij
ij
f r
h
r
−
=       (15) 
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is called the normalized distance between ijr  and 0f . 
Generally speaking, the expected profit value 
0f  reflects the broker’s historical profit and 
its psychological considerations. 
If 0ijr f , then ijh  represents a loss for the broker relative to its expected value 0f ; if 
0ijr f , then ijh  stands for a gain for the broker with respect to its expected value 0f . According 
to different risk attitudes towards gains and losses, the prospect value ijv  of matching pair 
( , )i jS D  for the broker can be defined as 
0
0
0
( ) ,   
0,     
( ) , , 1,2,..., ; 1,2,....,
ij ij
ij ij
ij ij
h r f
v r f
h r f i m j n


 

= =

−  = =
     (16) 
leading to the prospect value matrix 
ij m n
R v

 =    for the broker. 
  
4.2 A framework of a two-sided matching decision model based on prospect value matrices 
 
The prospect value matrices for the suppliers, users, and broker given in Section 4.1 reflect 
the stakeholders’ psychological considerations under uncertainty. This information can now serve 
as the decision input for two-sided matching of technological knowledge supply and demand. 
 
1 1
1 1
max                                                                       (17 )
max                                                                      (17 )
max  
n m
S ij ij
i j
n m
D ij ij
i j
I
Z v x a
Z v x b
Z
= =
= =
=
=
=


1 1
1
                                                                     (17 )
. . 1, 1,2,...,                                                                (17 )
     , 1
n m
ij ij
i j
m
ij
j
ij j
v x c
s t x i n d
x c j
= =
=
 =
 =


 
1
, 2,...,                                                              (17 )
     1                                                                                        (17 )
    0,1 , 1,2,.
n
i
j
ij
m e
c f
x i
=

 =

.., ; 1, 2,...,                                           (17 )n j m g=
 
where ijx  is a binary decision variable, indicating if the matching pair ( , )i jS D  is a success or 
not. (17 )a c−  are the objective functions for the stakeholders: (17 )a  maximizes the 
aggregate prospect value for all suppliers; (17 )b  refers to the users’ maximization of their total 
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prospect value, and (17 )c represents the broker’s maximization of its prospect value for all 
matching pairs; (17 )d  restricts each supplier iS  to match with at most one user to reflect the 
practical constraints on technology transfer. (17 )e  establishes the upper limit on the number of 
technology transfers that user jD  may possibly accept. 
The optimization model (17) has three objectives from the three parties, which can be 
conveniently converted to a single objective optimization model by using the weighted average 
approach as follows: 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
max             (18 )
. . 1, 1,2,...,                                                                             (1
n m n m n m n m
S ij ij D ij ij B ij ij ij ij
i j i j i j i j
m
ij
j
Z v x v x v x c x a
s t x i n
  
= = = = = = = =
=
= + + =
 =
   

 
1
8 )
     , 1, 2,...,                                                                           (18 )
     0,1 , 1,2,..., ; 1, 2,...,                                                       
n
ij j
i
ij
b
x c j m c
x i n j m
=
 =
 = =

 (18 )d
 
where ij S ij D ij B ijc v v v  = + + , , ,S D B    are, respectively, the weight for the suppliers, users, 
and the broker, reflecting their importance in the actual two-sided matching decision process. 
These weights are typically determined through a three-party consultation process or unilaterally 
determined by a dominating party, and 1S D B  + + = . 
Model (18) can be transformed to a standard assignment model that can be solved by using 
the Hungarian method. It is easy to see that the feasible region is nonempty and, hence, optimal 
solutions exist for (18). For such a model, if it is not too big, an optimal matching solution can be 
obtained by employing different software packages such as Lingo, Matlab, and WinQB2.0. 
 
4.3 Solution procedure 
 
The aforesaid discussions allow us to summarize the solution procedure of the proposed 
decision method for two-sided matching technological knowledge supply and demand as follows: 
Step 1: Determine evaluation matrices A and B by using (1) and (2) based on the suppliers’ 
and users’ evaluations of the other party and criteria weights; 
Step 2: Find the positive and negative ideal users and suppliers as per Definition 2 and 3, and 
calculate positive and negative relational coefficients of the suppliers and users by using the grey 
relational analysis method; 
Step 3: Obtain prospect values and prospect matrices for the suppliers and users based on the 
positive and negative relational coefficients of the suppliers and users as per Eqs. (8) and (14); 
Compute the broker’s prospect values and prospect value matrix as per (16); 
Step 4: Establish the multi-objective optimization model (17), and convert it to a single- 
objective optimization model (18) by using the weighted average method; 
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Step 5: Solve the optimization model (18) to obtain the optimal matching pairs. 
 
5 A case study 
 
This case study takes Jia Yong Technology Trade Centre as a representative broker to 
facilitate matching technological knowledge supply and demand in Nanjing, Jiangsu in China. 
Numerous higher education and research institutions are located in Nanjing. On the one hand, 
these research institutions produce a large quantity of technological knowledge, which fails to 
reach right users in industry to realize its economic benefit. On the other hand, many large-scale 
state-owned enterprises and numerous small and medium enterprises in the region have been 
actively seeking for open innovation opportunities by acquiring technological knowledge. This 
mis-match has significantly affected the commercialization of technology innovations and the 
innovation capability of the enterprises [Jian and Liu, 2012]. Therefore, it has become an urgent 
issue to better match suppliers and users of technological knowledge so that suppliers can 
commercialize their research results and contribute to the betterment of the general society, and 
users can benefit from open innovation and improve their competitiveness. In the meantime, the 
broker can collect commissions by providing value-added matching services. From an open 
innovation lens, this can be treated as a broker-assisted MFT.  
According to statistical data, there exist 405 brokers in the MFT to facilitate effective 
matching between suppliers and users in Nanjing. Jia Yong Technology Trade Center is one of 
these organizations and is selected as a representative broker to illustrate how the proposed model 
can incorporate different stakeholders’ psychological considerations into the two-sided matching 
process. To facilitate matching the needs of enterprises (users) and technology owners (suppliers), 
Jia Yong has been actively collecting relevant supply and demand information on technological 
knowledge. In March 2014, the broker received matching requests from four enterprises and five 
patent owners, denoted by 1 2 5( , ,..., )S S S  and 1 2 4( , ,..., )D D D . The five suppliers assess the 
four enterprises based on three criteria: patent technology transfer income (
1A ), technological 
level of the enterprise ( 2A ) and the speed of patent technology transfer ( 3A ). The four enterprises 
evaluate the five patents on five criteria: market prospect (
1B ), potential economic value ( 2B ), 
patent cost (B3), technology complexity ( 4B ), and technology advancement level ( 5B ). After 
evaluating actual needs and soliciting domain expert opinions, the three criterion weights for the 
enterprises (users) and the five criterion weights for the patents (suppliers) are, respectively, 
obtained as follows:  
(0.45,0.30,0.25)  and (0.3,0.18,0.22,0.15,0.15) .  
By collecting and assessing relevant suppliers and users information, the five suppliers 
furnish their evaluation on the four users based on the three criteria as shown in Table 1, and the 
four users assess the five suppliers as per the five criteria as given in Table 2. Given their limited 
financial resources and technological capability, the four users set up their upper limits of the 
maximum number of patents that they can possibly take as 2,2,1,1, respectively. By examining its 
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pools of suppliers and users, the broker estimates its commission revenue by providing the 20 
possible matching pairs as shown in Table 3 (in millions of RMB), and its expected value of each 
successful matching pair is 4 million RMB.  
Table 1 Evaluation values of the suppliers (patent owners) with respect to the users (enterprises) 
A S/D D1 D2 D3 D4 
A1 S1 0.90 0.82 0.55 0.78 
 S2 0.78 0.89 0.84 0.58 
 S3 0.85 0.69 0.76 0.80 
 S4 0.70 0.78 0.88 0.54 
 S5 0.65 0.80 0.74 0.90 
A2 S1 0.86 0.78 0.64 0.82 
 S2 0.73 0.90 0.88 0.65 
 S3 0.87 0.75 0.74 0.82 
 S4 0.69 0.75 0.86 0.63 
 S5 0.57 0.82 0.76 0.88 
A3 S1 0.85 0.66 0.60 0.75 
 S2 0.75 0.85 0.82 0.66 
 S3 0.88 0.84 0.79 0.65 
 S4 0.59 0.74 0.85 0.74 
 S5 0.76 0.68 0.82 0.87 
 
Table 2 Evaluation values of the users (enterprises) with respect to the suppliers (patent owners) 
B D/S S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
B1 D1 0.84 0.78 0.65 0.89 0.53 
 D2 0.66 0.84 0.75 0.49 0.88 
 D3 0.86 0.64 0.72 0.81 0.78 
 D4 0.65 0.78 0.85 0.80 0.65 
B2 D1 0.88 0.74 0.77 0.84 0.65 
 D2 0.72 0.88 0.79 0.64 0.92 
 D3 0.84 0.76 0.66 0.88 0.74 
 D4 0.73 0.69 0.88 0.78 0.64 
B3 D1 0.84 0.78 0.75 0.79 0.69 
 D2 0.78 0.82 0.74 0.65 0.88 
 D3 0.87 0.75 0.69 0.90 0.63 
 D4 0.82 0.57 0.88 0.75 0.71 
B4 D1 0.88 0.72 0.62 0.77 0.64 
 D2 0.75 0.86 0.68 0.74 0.81 
 D3 0.82 0.70 0.77 0.88 0.71 
 D4 0.79 0.64 0.89 0.74 0.69 
B5 D1 0.84 0.65 0.68 0.78 0.72 
 D2 0.76 0.89 0.75 0.71 0.83 
 D3 0.85 0.64 0.76 0.89 0.69 
 D4 0.78 0.68 0.85 0.72 0.65 
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Table 3 Revenue of the broker for the matching pairs 
S/D( ijr ) 
D1 D2 D3 D4 
S1 4.4 4.8 6 5.4 
S2 4.3 1 4.5 5.6 
S3 3.5 5 2.8 5.2 
S4 5.6 6 3.4 5.3 
S5 4.4 3.9 5.3 5.1 
 
Given the aforesaid decision input, one can execute the procedures laid out in Section 4.3 as 
follows. 
Step 1: Given the suppliers’ evaluations of the users in Table 1 and the users’ assessments of 
the suppliers in Table 2 as well as the associated criteria weights, one can obtain the overall 
evaluation values based on formulas (1) and (2) as shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 Mutual satisfaction evaluation values of the suppliers and users 
D/S S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
D1 （0.8532,0.8755） （0.7443,0.7575） （0.8245,0.8635） （0.8245,0.6695） （0.6318,0.6535） 
D2 （0.7257,0.768） （0.8533,0.883） （0.7445,0.7455） （0.6227,0.761） （0.8692,0.776） 
D3 （0.8511,0.5895） （0.6948,0.847） （0.7161,0.7615） （0.8649,0.8665） （0.7158,0.766） 
D4 （0.7423,0.7845） （0.6816,0.621） （0.868,0.7685） （0.7644,0.617） （0.6674,0.8865） 
 
Step 2: Based on the overall evaluations, the positive and negative ideal users and suppliers 
are, respectively, determined as follows: 
0 0.8755 0.883 0.866( , , ,5 0. 65)88D
+ = ; 0 0.6535 0.7455 0.5895( , , ,0. 17)6D
− =  
0 0.8532 0.8533 0.868 0.8649,0( ., 9, )2, 86S
+ = ; 0 0.7257 0.6816 0.7161 0.6227,0( ., , 6 )18, 3S
− =
 
Plugging these values into formulas (5), (6), (11) and (12), the positive and negative 
relational coefficients of the suppliers and users can be determined, which are omitted here for the 
sake of brevity.  
Step 3: To apply the prospect theory given in [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992], the three parameter values , ,  and     must be obtained first. As mentioned 
earlier, stakeholders from different geographical locations may possess distinct risk profiles, 
corresponding to different parameter values. To calibrate the model with our case study, 
experiments were conducted to estimate the three parameter values for , ,  and    . To 
accomplish this task, 380 scientific and technological employees and government officials in 
Nanjing (180 males and 200 females) were commissioned and their opinions were solicited. Then, 
an SPSS nonlinear regression model is exploited to estimate the model parameters [Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992], resulting in 1.18, 1.12, 2.25  = = = . A further 
chi-square test was conducted to confirm that these parameter values are greater than 1 at a 
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significant level of 1%. Compared with the parameter values in the literature [Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992], these values are relatively small, indicating that 
the scientific and technological employees and government officials in Nanjing tend to display 
gradual sensitivity to risk according to the prospect theory. Plugging the positive and negative 
relational coefficients of the suppliers and users into (7) and (13), one can calculate the positive 
and negative prospect values of the suppliers and users, thereby determining their prospect value 
matrices based on (8) and (14) as shown in Table 5. According to the possible revenues in Table 3 
and the broker’s expected value for each successful matching pair, the prospect value matrix of the 
broker is computed based on (15) and (16) and shown in Table 6. 
Table 5 a. The prospect value matrix of the suppliers 
D/S D1 D2 D3 D4 
S1 -1.9266  -0.3060  0.3426  -0.8203  
S2 -0.6120  -1.8068  -1.6519  0.2886  
S3 -1.7135  -0.0394  -0.8103  -0.7102  
S4 0.0681  -0.2266  -1.9765  0.3291  
S5 0.2293  -0.3944  -0.8420  -1.9705  
 
Table 5 b. The prospect value matrix of the users 
D/S D1 D2 D3 D4 
S1 -1.8220  -0.0054  -1.7748  -0.2270  
S2 -0.4852  -1.8972  0.0036  0.1629  
S3 0.1715  -0.3629  -0.0875  -1.9010  
S4 -1.3154  0.3426  -1.9763  -0.7427  
S5 0.3327  -1.9721  -0.3628  -0.0124  
 
Table 6 Prospect values of the broker 
D/S D1 D2 D3 D4 
S1 0.0409  0.0928  0.2735  0.1796  
S2 0.0292  -1.0352  0.0533  0.2102  
S3 -0.1391  0.1207  -0.3710  0.1497  
S4 0.2102  0.0181  -0.1707  0.1645  
S5 0.0409  -0.0229  0.1645  0.1351  
 
 
Step 4: Based on the prospect values of the suppliers, users and broker, a multi-objective 
optimization model (17) can be constructed. According to the status and importance of the 
suppliers, users and broker in the actual matching situation, the weights of the suppliers, users and 
broker could be determined by consultation as 0.35, 0.45, 0.20S D B  = = = , (17) can then be 
converted to a single-objective optimization model (18) by using the weighted average method, 
and the coefficient matrix ij n m
c

    is determined and shown in Table 7. To facilitate comparison 
16 
 
with the matching result without psychological behaviours, the coefficient matrix of model (18) is 
obtained by directly taking the weighted average of matrices A, B in Table 4 and H by using (15), 
and this matrix is displayed in Table 8. 
Table 7 Coefficient matrix with psychological behaviours 
S/D( ijr ) 
D1 D2 D3 D4 
S1 -1.4860  -0.0910  -0.6240  -0.3533  
S2 -0.4267  -1.6931  -0.5659  0.2164 
S3 -0.5504  -0.1530  -0.3972  -1.0741  
S4 -0.5261  0.0785 -1.6152  -0.1861  
S5 0.2382 -1.0301  -0.4250  -0.6682  
 
Table 8 Coefficient matrix without psychological behaviours 
S/D( ijr ) 
D1 D2 D3 D4 
S1 0.7037 0.6220  0.6560  0.6553  
S2 0.6101  0.7930  0.6258  0.5774  
S3 0.6310  0.6293  0.6288  0.6996 
S4 0.6587  0.5532  0.7125 0.6033  
S5 0.5264  0.6661 0.6335  0.6473  
Step 5: Different software packages such as Lingo, Matlab13.0, and WinSQB can be applied 
to solve the optimization model (18) with and without psychological considerations, and the 
matching results are derived and shown in Table 9.  
Table 9 Matching results with and without accounting for psychological behaviour 
Two-sided matching method Matching results 
without psychological behaviours (S1,D1) (S2,D2) (S3,D4) (S4,D3) (S5,D2) 
with psychological behaviours __ (S2,D4) __ (S4,D2) (S5,D1) 
The matching results in Table 9 demonstrate that all suppliers will be matched with a user 
with (S1, D1), (S2, D2), (S3, D4), (S4, D3), and (S5, D2) being the five matching pairs if the 
stakeholders’ psychological behaviours are not considered. However, once psychological 
considerations are introduced via the prospect theory, matching results have been significantly 
changed. As a matter of fact, none of the previous successful matching pairs survives: suppliers 1 
and 3 cannot be matched with any user now. Although suppliers 2, 4, and 5 can still be matched 
with users, but their matching partners differ from the previous solution without psychological 
considerations. The matching results without psychological behaviours are derived based on 
perfect rationality. However, stakeholders have their expected assessments on potential matching 
pairs. The relative gains/losses with respect to these reference points will understandably affect the 
stakeholders’ overall evaluations of the matching results. By incorporating the prospect theory 
with the calibrated model parameters , ,  and     through a field study, the final solution 
properly reflects what happened in reality: Although the broker, Jia Yong Technology Trade Center, 
aims to match the patents from the five research groups with the four enterprises, it fails to find 
matching partners for suppliers 1 and 3 as well as user 3.  
From a policy implication perspective, those stakeholders without recommended matching 
partners fail to meet the expectations and needs of the other stakeholders. At the macro level, 
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national and local governments should introduce appropriate regulations and policies to promote 
the exchange and cooperation between the universities, research institutions and enterprises. In so 
doing, universities and research institutions can better understand the needs and expectations of 
enterprises to create readily transferrable technological knowledge, and enterprises can obtain 
necessary attributes of technological knowledge that is of their interests, and the brokers can have 
policy and funding support to provide better matching service between universities and enterprises. 
At the micro level, all stakeholders should better understand the expectations of the other parties: 
the suppliers should provide more detailed information on their technology innovations, the users 
should elaborate more on their specific needs and expectations, and the brokers should establish a 
more convenient platform to facilitate information exchange between the users and suppliers in 
order to improve matching efficiency.  
The key contributions of this research are threefold: 1) It furnishes a novel theoretical model 
for matching supply and demand in a broker-assisted MFT; 2) Methodologically, the proposed 
model can effectively capture market participants’ psychological considerations; 3) The case study 
demonstrates that, by properly calibrating model parameters, the proposed approach can be 
applied to real-world technological knowledge trading in an MFT and yields matching results that 
are consistent with the reality.  
 
6 Conclusions 
 
In the process of technological knowledge exchange, matching subjects (suppliers and users) 
and the broker are typically agents with limited rationality. By employing the prospect theory and 
grey relational analysis, this paper develops a two-sided matching decision framework for 
matching supply and demand of technological knowledge. The proposed method is conceived to 
account for stakeholders’ psychological considerations in the decision process, thereby deriving 
more realistic matching results. A real-world case analysis is employed to demonstrate how the 
proposed model can be applied to solve a two-sided matching problem in technological 
knowledge exchange in a broker-assisted MFT. Analytical results show that this approach with 
psychological considerations is able to generate matching pairs that are more consistent with what 
happened in reality. This research improves and extends the applications of the two-sided 
matching theory to the MFT in the open innovation paradigm.   
The proposed model has its limitations. For example, it does not differentiate the types of 
knowledge exchanged (established vs. novel, tacit vs. codified, general vs specialized) [Ardito et 
al. 2016, Nielsen and Nielsen 2009]. Moreover, the model focuses on incorporating psychological 
behaviour of the MFT participants and does not consider their other characteristics. These issues 
warrant further studies in the future.  
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